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Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 703: Is It a Hidden
Exception to the Hearsay Rule?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Expert witnesses may be found in all walks of life: from the mobile
home repairer' or the termite inspector 2 to the doctor or technologist.3
The available spectrum of expert testimony gives practicing attorneys an
arsenal of tools to use against their opponents. "Shopping" for experts
is the norm rather than the exception; it is now commonplace for an
attorney to proffer an expert who is willing to support the attorney's
cause. 4 Likewise, an opposing party, faced with the prospect of having
to discredit the adversary's expert, will find another qualified expert to
render a suitable contradictory opinion. This type of trial strategy makes
it necessary for attorneys to find expert witnesses who will render reliable
opinions. More importantly, this trial technique presents experts as de
facto advocates, beyond mere presenters of knowledge and expertise.
In fact, the notion that experts are often used as advocates was
accepted by jurists and scholars more than a century ago. Justice Grier
of the United States Supreme Court wrote in 1858, "[E]xperience has
shown that opposite opinions of persons professing to be experts may
be obtained to any amount .
".S.."I
Lord Chief Justice Campbell charged

Copyright 1993, by LoUISINA LAW REVIEW.
I. See Aaron v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co., 475 So. 2d 379 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1985) (a mobile home repairer was qualified as an expert to testify regarding damage to
a mobile home in transit based solely on his seven years experience in the field).
2. See Hebert v. Broussard, 450 So. 2d 1038 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984) (a termite
inspector with twenty-five years experience in the field was qualified as an expert to testify
to the presence of termite damage to a house).
3. See Department of Health and Human Resources v. Rice, 482 So. 2d 873 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1986) (an expert in the field of paternity testing was allowed to give his
interpretation of the results of a paternity test despite the fact he was not a medical
doctor).
4. For the practicing attorney, a listing of technical experts may be found in The
Directory of Expert Witnesses in Technology which is a compilation of about 9,000 selfdesignated experts in fields ranging from chemistry and civil engineering to physics and
energy technology. The ABA Journal reviews the book as a "useful source of potential
experts for law firms with a substantial amount of high-technology litigation." Robert
P. Bigelow, Directory of Expert Witnesses in Technology, 71 A.B.A. J. 74, 76 (Aug.
1985) (book review).
5. William L. Foster, Expert Testimony-Prevalent Complaints and Proposed Remedies, II Harv. L. Rev. 169, 169 (1898) (citing Winans v. New York & Erie RR., 21
How. 88, 101 (1858)).
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a jury concerning expert testimony in an 1856 murder trial by stating,
"It is ... indispensable to the administration of justice that a witness
'6
should not be turned into an advocate, nor an advocate into a witness."
There is a conflict between the desired goal of insuring the reliability
of expert opinions and the consequences of experts acting as de facto
advocates. Surely the impact of experts as advocates influences the
integrity of the judicial system. Moreover, this impact is a debatable
one which is subject to abuse by the proponents of experts. Especially
today, with the increasing role of experts in the courtroom, insuring
the reliability of expert testimony is of compelling importance.
This comment will discuss the reliability of expert testimony as it
relates to the Louisiana Code of Evidence article 703. First, this comment
will briefly review the Louisiana Code of Evidence articles relating to
expert opinion testimony. Second, the comment will illustrate how some
facts and data upon which experts rely are unreliable, thereby rendering
untrustworthy the subsequent opinions based on those facts and data.
Third, the comment will discuss the ambiguity of the reasonable reliance
test of the Louisiana Code of Evidence article 703 which opens the
door to two opposing interpretations. This comment will suggest the
restrictive interpretation is preferable because it provides the most adequate method of insuring the reliability of expert opinions. Fourth, the
comment will look at how Louisiana courts have interpreted Article 703
in light of the ambiguity. And lastly, this comment will suggest that
"basis testimony" be admitted as substantive evidence only if the restrictive interpretation is uniformly employed by Louisiana courts.
II.

LOUISIANA CODE OF EVIDENCE AND EXPERT TESTIMONY

First, a brief summary of the code articles relating to expert testimony is necessary. One of the objectives of the Louisiana Code of
Evidence is to insure the reliability of expert testimony. According to
the scheme of the code, the expert must be properly qualified; the
opinion must be "helpful" to the trier of fact; 7 the opinion must be

6. Id. at 170 (quoting Lord Chief Justice Campbell in his charge to the jury in a
famous murder trial held in England in 1856).
7. Louisiana Code of Evidence article 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
An expert's opinion will be helpful when it will "assist the trier of fact." This
occurs "[w]henever the triers of fact are confronted with issues which cannot be determined
intelligently on the basis of ordinary judgment and practical experience .... Mason
Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 414, 418 (1952).
Mere experience is sufficient to qualify a person as an expert. See Belk v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 501 So. 2d 1008 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987) (a man with only a high school
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legally relevant to a fact in issue;8 and, the basis of the opinion must
pass the reasonable reliance test of Article 703. 9 Additionally, there is
a possibility the basis of the opinion must comply with the test formulated by the court in Frye v. United States. 0 All of the above tests
are preliminary matters for the court to decide."
This comment is specifically concerned with Louisiana Code of
Evidence article 703 which permits experts to base their opinions on

degree was qualified as an expert in lawn mower design because he had worked in the
mowing business since 1952 and had been previously qualified as an expert by other
courts).
Additionally, the judge has discretion to decide whether a witness is qualified, and
this decision is subject to review using the abuse of discretion standard. See Doyle v.
Picadilly Cafeterias, 576 So. 2d 1143 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991); Hebert v. Belk Constr.
Co., Inc., 499 So. 2d 1079 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 501 So. 2d 198 (1986);
Dawsey v. Olin Corp., 782 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir. 1986).
8. Louisiana Code of Evidence article 401 states: 'Relevant evidence' means evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."
Louisiana Code of Evidence article 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or
waste of time." See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1255
(D.C.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234, 108
S. Ct. 2898 (1988) ("Any decision to allow or exclude evidence under [Federal] Rule 403
must be based on a detailed analysis of the specific facts of the case at hand ....
).
There is also a danger of misleading and confusing the jury with highly technical
expert testimony in complex toxic tort and products liability litigation because of "[a]
false aura of scientific infallibility, coupled with low probative value" that occasionally
accompanies this type of evidence. Id. at 1256.
9. Louisiana Code of Evidence article 703 states: "The facts or data in the particular
case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or
made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in a particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts
or data need not be admissible in evidence."
10. 293 F. Supp. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Under the Frye test, the court must ask
whether the expert, in reaching his conclusion, used well-founded methodology which has
gained general scientific acceptance in the field. There is some question whether the
Louisiana Code of Evidence adopts the Frye test. For example, under the Federal Rules
of Evidence, after which Louisiana's code is modeled, the U.S. Supreme Court has yet
to rule on whether the Federal Rules of Evidence abolish Frye. See Randolph N. Jonakait,
The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the Changed Rules of Evidence, 68 Tex. L.
Rev. 745 (1990). However, in Adams v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 589 So. 2d 1219, 1223
(La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 592 So. 2d 414 (1991), after listing the relevant code
articles used to determine admissibility of expert testimony and the Frye test, the court
stated, "We adopt those standards as appropriate for evaluating the admissibility of expert
testimony under Louisiana law."
11. Louisiana Code of Evidence article 104(A) states: "Preliminary questions concerning the competency or qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a
privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court .... .
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otherwise inadmissible hearsay "if of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts" in a given field. 2 Whether or not expert bases are disclosed
to the jury is addressed by Article 705.11 Disclosure of an expert's
underlying facts on direct examination is permissible 4 and often necessary"
because the jury needs enough information to properly weigh the credibility of the expert.16 Consequently, the jury may hear otherwise inadmissible hearsay in the form of "basis testimony."
III.

UNRELIABILITY OF THE UNDERLYING FACTS AND DATA

At first glance, experts appear to be reliable witnesses. An expert
who is properly qualified carries a degree of authority and credibility
that is unsurpassed in any other type of witness.' 7 However, when an

12. See La. Code Evid. art. 703, supra note 9.
13. Louisiana Code of Evidence article 705(A) states: "In a civil case, the expert
may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons therefor without prior
disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert
may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination."
(emphasis added).
Because this comment is concerned with the "facts and data" underlying the expert's
opinion rather than the expert's "reasons" for the opinion, a distinction needs to be
made. Take, for example, a wrongful death case where the plaintiff will only present
circumstantial evidence. The time of death must be established before 11:00 p.m. in order
to prove the defendant was the one who caused the death. The plaintiff calls a medical
expert who was "told" that the victim ate pizza at 7:00 p.m. on the night of the murder.
The expert's conclusion (the opinion) is that the victim died between 8:00 p.m. and 11:00
p.m. which places the defendant at the scene. His reasons for the opinion are that because
the stomach stops digesting food immediately upon death and because the victim had
only digested five percent of the food when the autopsy was performed, the victim must
have died three to four hours after eating. However, the main fact that formed the basis
of the opinion was that the victim ate at 7:00 p.m. This fact is hearsay. Under Article
705, the expert need not disclose this fact unless the court requires otherwise. But, the
credibility of the opinion turns on whether this fact is known and believed by the jury.
14. Note that the judge may require the expert to disclose the underlying facts and
data on direct examination under Article 705. See supra note 13.
15. Charles T. McCormick, Evidence § 324.3, at 372 (J. Strong 4th ed. 1992) ("The
expert should as a general matter be allowed to disclose to the trier of fact the basis of
his or her opinion, because otherwise the opinion is left unsupported with little way for
the jury to evaluate its correctness."). See also Doyle v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, 576 So.
2d 1143, 1152 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991) ("Nor do we find that the trial court erred in
allowing [the expert] to testify as to projected lost future earnings and future medical
expenses. [The expert] explained all the underlying facts and assumptions on which he
based his opinions and he also explained the basis of his calculations ....
The credibility
of this testimony . .. was a matter for the jury to weigh.").
16. McCormick, supra note 15, § 324.3, at 372.
17. Moreover, the weight accorded to the expert opinion depends on the expert's
qualifications. See Arceneaux v. Daggett, 594 So. 2d 1001, 1005 (La. App. 3d Cir.) ("The
importance placed upon expert testimony is largely dependent on the expert's qualifications
and facts that form the basis of his or her opinion."), writ denied, 597 So. 2d 1029
(1992).
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expert bases an opinion on unreliable data, the subsequent opinion will
be untrustworthy. According to Article 703, an expert may rely on facts
and data which are either perceived by him personally or made known
to him by another source. These underlying facts and data may be
inadmissible hearsay evidence if the expert reasonably relies upon the
data.
8
In re "'Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation"
provides an
example of how expert opinions may be based on unreliable hearsay
evidence. The toxic tort controversy arose out of the government's use
of the defendants' herbicide during the Vietnam war. The plaintiffs
(veterans exposed to the herbicide, their wives, and their children) alleged
that as a result of exposure to the toxic herbicide, they suffered numerous
maladies, ranging from miscarriages and birth defects to baldness. The
defendants, seven manufacturers of Agent Orange, moved for summary
judgment on the ground the plaintiffs did not establish a causal link
between their product and the adverse health problems alleged.' 9 The
motion was granted.
The plaintiffs unsuccessfully countered the motion by producing two
properly qualified physicians. The first expert, without examining any
of the plaintiffs or their medical records, based his opinion (that Agent
Orange did have a causal connection with the plaintiffs' symptoms) upon
"checklists" formulated by the individual plaintiffs attesting to their
own symptoms. 20 In the expert's final analysis, he concluded Agent
Orange must have caused the plaintiffs' health problems only if 1) the
plaintiffs were telling the truth, and 2) there were no other causes of
the health problems. 21 The court criticized the logic underlying the expert's conclusion by stating, "One need hardly be a doctor of medicine
to make the statement that if X is a possible cause of Y, and if there
is no other possible cause of Y, X must have caused Y.,, 2 2 More
significantly, the court excluded the opinion based on Federal Rule of
Evidence 703 because "no reputable physician relies on hearsay checklists
by litigants to reach a conclusion with respect to the cause of their
afflictions. 2 3 The second expert relied on the same checklists-to form
his opinion. However, he also based his opinion on the plaintiffs' military
and medical records to determine the extent of their exposure to Agent

18. 611 F. Supp. 1223 (D.C.N.Y. 1985). Federal cases will be used as persuasive
authority in this comment because Fed. R. Evid. 703 is the verbatim equivalent of La.
Code Evid. art. 703.
19. Id.at 1229.
20. In re "Agent Orange", 611 F. Supp. at 1235.
21. Id. at 1237.
22. Id. at 1238.
23. Id.at 1246 (citing U.S. v. Downing, 753 F.2d. 1224, 1238 n.18 (3d Cir.), aff'd,
780 F.2d 1017 (1985)).
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Orange. 24 Again, the court excluded the opinion of the second expert
25
because the bases were unreliable.
If an expert's underlying data is unreliable, the subsequent opinion
based on that data will likely be untrustworthy. However, Louisiana
Code of Evidence article 703 is designed to protect against the risk of
unreliable expert opinions with the reasonable reliance test. In the sections
that follow, this comment will discuss this test, the application of the
test in both federal and Louisiana jurisprudence, and the potential
problems with each interpretation.
IV.

THE REASONABLE

RELIANCE TEST OF ARTICLE

703

Assuming an expert is qualified, 26 the opinion is deemed helpful to
the trier of fact, 27 it passes the relevancy test, 2 and possibly the Frye
test, 29 the bases of the opinion must comply with the reasonable reliance
test of Louisiana Code of Evidence article 703.3 0 Because Article 703
allows experts to base their opinions on facts not supported by the
record 31 and on otherwise inadmissible data, the reasonable reliance test
is necessary to safeguard against the use of untrustworthy basis testimony
by experts in forming opinions. The rule recognizes experts are the most
competent to judge the reliability of facts and data which give rise to
an expert opinion. 32 The test also assumes experts will not rely on
untrustworthy data in their professional practices, much less for use at
trial in light of their competent professional judgment.
The words "reasonably rely," however, are ambiguous for two
reasons. First, as a general matter, if ten "small time" experts customarily rely on certain data in forming opinions on the subject, and the
two leading experts in the field rely on other data in forming the same
opinions, what is reasonable reliance? Second, who makes the determination of what type of data is reasonably relied upon by experts, the
experts in the field or the court? Courts have developed two views, one

24. Id. at 1247.
25. Id. at 1248. Also, the court excluded the opinion based on Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Id. at 1256.
26. See supra note 7.
27. Id.
28. See supra note 8.
29. See supra note 10.
30. See La. Code Evid. art. 703, supra note 9.
31. See Baunam v. Centex Corp., 611 F.2d 1115, 1120 (5th Cir. 1980) ("The record
indicates that these sources, while not at all in evidence, are of the type reasonably relied
upon by certified public accountants ... and did not render the testimony unreliable.")
(emphasis added).
32. McCormick, supra note 15, § 15, at 64-65.
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liberal and one restrictive, in applying the reasonable reliance test.33 Both
approaches present difficulties.
A.

The Liberal Approach

The liberal interpretation of Article 703 supports the view that the
court should give deference to the expert, at least on the issue of whether
experts in a given field rely on the type of data used by the testifying
expert. Once the bases are found to meet the "type" requirement, the
underlying data is presumed reliable; thus, the standard of Article 703
is met. The justification is that the expert is more capable of judging
whether experts in the field rely on a certain type of data, especially
in specialized areas of science and technology, than the judge, who is
simply ill-equipped to make such determinations.3 4 Consequently, judicial
inquiry into the matter becomes unnecessary, thereby maximizing judicial
efficiency.3"
In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation3 6 provides
an example of how one court liberally construed Federal Rule of Evidence
703. There the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that the
district court erred in excluding an economic expert's report revealing
the major disparity between the prices of Japanese television sets sold
in the United States and the prices of the same sets sold in Japan. The
court interpreted Rule 703 liberally when it noted, "The proper inquiry
is not what the court deems reliable, but what experts in the relevant
discipline deem it to be." ' 37 The mere existence of the expert's affidavit
asserting that other experts in the field rely on the type of data used
was sufficient.3"
The court in Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp. 9 a more recent
U.S. Fifth Circuit case, also liberally interpreted Federal Rule of Evidence
703, even though the opinion of the plaintiffs' expert was ultimately
excluded in the wrongful death action. In Christophersen, the plaintiffs

33. Id. at 65.
34. Id.
35. Since the admissibility of expert testimony is a judicial function under Louisiana
Code of Evidence article 104(A), Article 703, if liberally construed, would necessarily
lessen the burden on the judiciary to determine the admissibility of the opinion testimony
because experts are given deference on the determination of what type of data is normally
relied upon.
36. 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Ct.
1348 (1985).
37. Id. at 276.
38. Id. See also Peteet v. Dow Chemical Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1432 (5th Cir.) ("In
making this determination, the trial court should defer to the expert's opinion of what
data they find reasonably reliable."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 935, 110 S. Ct. 328 (1989).
39. 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
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proffered Dr. Miller as an expert to establish causation between the
cancer which caused Christophersen's death and the chemicals used to
manufacture nickel/cadmium batteries at the plant where Christophersen
worked. Dr. Miller based his opinion almost exclusively on the affidavit
of an employee of the plant. The district court found the affidavit was
incomplete because it lacked any facts indicating the type of fumes
emitted by the plant or the type to which Christophersen was exposed.4
The court also found the affidavit was inaccurate because it overstated
the length of Christophersen's exposure to the chemicals. 41 On rehearing
en banc, the Fifth circuit affirmed the district court's exclusion of the
opinion by questioning Dr. Miller's underlying facts and data based on
the affidavit. However, the court stated:
We do not of course say that Rule 703 requires that all facts
and data underlying the opinion must relate perfectly to the
record facts. As we have pointed out, only when the facts and
data are critically inaccurate or incomplete, as determined by
what other experts would or would not be willing to base opinions upon, would the facts and data lack the necessary requisites of Rule 703.42
Although the liberal interpretation of Article 703 is efficient, it is
not without its faults. First, by giving the expert the discretion to
determine what data is reasonable to rely upon, the judicial role of
determining admissibility will be hampered. Article 104(A) is based on
the premise that the court, as a neutral figure, has the function of
regulating the reliability of evidence which will reach the ears of unsophisticated jurors.4 3 Moreover, this function is not discretionary; Article
104(A) states that "the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by
the court."
The most significant and perhaps the most damaging
manifestation of this problem occurs when an expert is employed solely
for the purpose of testifying. 45 In that instance, the biased expert will
testify that the data meets the "type" requirement of Article 703, the
court will give deference to the expert on the question of what data is
customarily relied upon by other experts, and the opinion will be ad-

40. Id. at 1113.
41.

Id.

42. Id. at 1115 (emphasis added).
43. See the Official Comment (d) to Louisiana Code of Evidence article 104(A) which
states: "The final sentence of paragraph A is based on the recognition that most of the
rules of evidence are intended to regulate the quality and reliability of evidence reaching
the untrained juror, not the court."
44. See La. Code Evid. art. 104(A), supra note 11 (emphasis added).
45. McCormick, supra note 15, § 15, at 65. It is not always the case that an expert
is employed solely for the purpose of testifying. For example, a lay witness in a case
may be qualified as an expert based on his experience once he takes the stand.
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mitted into evidence without further inquiry into the reasonableness of
the expert's use of the data. This is not to suggest the expert will
intentionally lie about the reasonableness of the reliance; however, the
employed expert does have a monetary interest in advocating the position
of his employer which necessarily makes the expert biased.
The root of the problem is that courts employing the liberal approach
fail to probe into the circumstantial trustworthiness of the underlying
facts and data because the reasonable reliance test assumes that if the
expert reasonably relies on a certain type of data, the opinion is sufficiently reliable for admissibility. However, the relevant question is:
were the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the data such that
there is a substantial likelihood the data is reliable for the purpose of
admitting the opinion into evidence? This inquiry forms the basis for
all hearsay exceptions. 46 For example, the dying declaration exception 47
assumes the chances of a person lying about the causes of his present
trauma while consumed by the belief of immediate death are slim. So,
given the then existing physical trauma of the declarant and his belief
of impending death, the court will admit the utterance even though it
is hearsay because the circumstances indicate its reliability. If an expert
is allowed to testify to the basis of the opinion without a guarantee of
the circumstantial trustworthiness of the bases, otherwise inadmissible
hearsay will be heard by the jury.
As a result of the court's failure to inquire into the circumstantial
trustworthiness of the expert's bases, another problem arises. By allowing
experts the discretion to determine if the type of data is reasonably
relied upon by other experts, courts using the liberal approach run the
risk of the expert replacing the role of the fact-finder. Take, for example,
the case of Parmelle v. Marietta Michoud.4s In Parmelle, the defendant's
expert relied on the plaintiff's medical records from prior hospitalizations
to form the opinion that the plaintiff was not injured in a slip and fall
accident. Although the court noted these records were not admissible
under any hearsay exception, the appellate court liberally interpreted
Article 703 to find the reports were improperly excluded by the trial
court. One of the two medical reports in Parmelle included nurses'

46. All hearsay exceptions require a certain degree of circumstantial trustworthiness.
For example, Louisiana Code of Evidence article 804(B)(6) states that a hearsay statement
will be admissible "[in a civil case, [when] a statement [is] not specifically covered by
any of the foregoing exceptions if the court determines that considering all pertinent
circumstances in the particularcase the statement is trustworthy ....
(emphasis added).
47. According to Louisiana Code of Evidence article 804(B)(2) the dying declaration
exception applies when "[a] statement [is] made by a declarant while believing that his
death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what he believed to be
his impending death."
48. 566 So. 2d 441 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990).
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notes.4 9 Although nurses' notes are probably trustworthy and the physician reasonably relied on them, the physician, in effect, made a credibility judgment about the trustworthiness of the nurses. The point is
that the reasonable reliance test in some instances will allow experts to
make credibility judgments which are better left to the jury.
The liberal interpretation of Article 703 is beneficial to the judiciary
because it takes the burden of analyzing sometimes highly technical
expert opinions off of the judges and places it on the people who know
the subject matter best-the experts. However, there is a trade-off. Not
only might the expert supplant the judicial function of determining
admissibility, but the expert might also occupy the role of the factfinder. Whether the liberal interpretation of Article 703 is the best way
to handle expert testimony may be a matter of policy: do we want
experts to have such broad discretion in the courts today? There is an
alternative approach to interpreting Article 703.
B. The Restrictive Approach
The restrictive approach is another method courts use to determine
whether the standard of Article 703 is met.50 This method requires that
the judge, not the expert, make an independent determination of the
reliability of the expert's underlying data." Unlike the liberal approach,
this approach assumes that even though the data meets the "type"
requirement of Article 703, the data may be unreliable.
It seems illogical to say experts will purposefully form opinions in
their professional capacities based on unreliable data, especially when
the consequences of erroneous conclusions in the "real world" would
be devastating. In fact, this is the justification behind the reasonable
reliance test. However, an attorney's use of expert opinions based on
unreliable data may have more of an impact in the courtroom than in
the expert's day-to-day practices. This is especially true in instances
where the expert's opinion does not bear on the protection of life or
the prevention of life threatening conditions or when the opinions are
formed at the attorney's direction.

49.

Id. at 445.

50. McCormick, supra note 15, § 15, at 66 ("On balance the restrictive approach is
preferable.").
51. Under the restrictive approach, an expert's reliance on certain data will be reasonable if two questions are answered in the affirmative: 1) Is it the practice of experts
in the given field to rely on this type of data?, and 2) Is it reasonable for this expert
to rely on this data? Id. at 65 n.10. These two inquiries have been described as the
"kind" and the "manner of acquisition" distinction. See Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible
Evidence as a Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony: A Response to Professor Carlson, 40
Vand. L. Rev. 583, 589 (1987). So, not only must the data rise to the level of general
expert acceptance, but it must also be gathered in such a way to assure its trustworthiness.
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For example, an automobile mechanic forms an opinion that his
customer needs a new transmission based on the customer's description
of the car's behavior over the past few days and a cursory inspection
of the car. Now, take the same mechanic, the same opinion, the same
customer and add a products liability dispute against the manufacturer
involving a large amount of money; one can easily see the more significant impact of the opinion based partly upon hearsay in court.
If the bases of the opinion in the above example meet the "type"
requirement, a liberal reading of Article 703 would allow the opinion
into evidence, assuming all the other evidentiary requirements were met.
However, with a restrictive interpretation, an additional inquiry into the
circumstantial trustworthiness of the underlying facts would be necessary
which may render the opinion inadmissible.
Several courts have employed the restrictive approach. 52 In Barrel
of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.," the court applied
the restrictive approach to exclude the results of a voice stress analysis
test used to determine whether the insured committed arson. After
analyzing the unreliability of this form of lie detector analysis, the court
stated, "Because we hold today that PSE evidence, whether in the form
of raw data or expert opinion interpreting or extrapolating upon that
data, is inherently suspect, Rule 703 cannot, standing alone, provide an
avenue for its admission." '5 4 The court in Barrel of Fun independently
analyzed the reliability of the voice stress test and found the expert's
opinion based solely upon it should be excluded because an expert could
not possibly reasonably rely on such unreliable data. A negative implication from this reasoning is a determination of reasonable reliance by
the court under this approach will be a determination of the reliability
of the underlying data. Consequently, the court in Barrel of Fun restrictively interpreted Rule 703.
A problem with the restrictive approach is that some expert opinions
5
will be excluded even though the data meets the "type" requirement. 5

52. See Soden v. Freightliner Corp., 714 F.2d 498, 505 (5th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Esle, 743 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1984); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611
F. Supp. 1223 (D.C.N.Y. 1985).
53. 739 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1984).
54. Id.at 1033.
55. McCormick, supra note 15, § 15, at 66. A primary assumption made by courts
who employ the restrictive approach is that an expert's underlying facts and data are
unreliable if they are not of a type relied upon by experts in the field. However, in
reaching this conclusion, courts do evaluate the circumstantial trustworthiness of the basis
testimony when they restrictively construe Rule 703. For example, in Soden, 714 F.2d at
503, the court stated:
[W]e conclude that [the statistics] were not shown to be of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in his field, and thus the district court did not abuse
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The effect of this does not comport with the language of Article 703.
The article uses the phrase "[ilf of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in a particular field .... "56 The rule expressly speaks to the
"type" requirement; it says nothing about an independent evaluation
of the data's circumstantial trustworthiness by the court. However, Article 703 does not, by itself, permit the wholesale introduction of expert
testimony into evidence because of the other barriers to admissibility,
such as the qualification of the expert and the helpfulness and relevancy
5
of the opinion. 7 For example, in Christophersen,
the court stated, "If,
taking all considerations into account, a court finds that the potential
for prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value, the court may
opt to exclude the testimony." 5 9 So, it really makes no difference that
expert opinions could be excluded under this approach even when the
"type" requirement is met, because other evidentiary requirements also
render opinions meeting the "type" requirement inadmissible.
Although the restrictive approach requires the court to make an
additional inquiry into the circumstantial trustworthiness of the expert's
underlying facts and data which could preclude the trier of fact from
considering some expert opinions, there is an advantage. The underlying
facts and data and the subsequent expert opinion will be sufficiently
reliable for the purpose of admissibility. Since insuring the reliability of
evidence is an objective of the code, the restrictive approach is a better
way to interpret Article 703 than the liberal approach.
V.

LOUISIANA'S POSITION

Like the federal circuits,6° the Louisiana appellate courts appear to
be unsettled as to which approach is preferable. For example, in Adams
v. Chevron U.S.A.,61 the fourth circuit court of appeal held the trial
court erred in excluding the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert. Adams

its discretion in excluding any opinion dependent on them. First, the statistics
on which Hutton relied were prepared strictly in anticipation of litigation and
were based on information received from a sister company. They were not part
of a published study and were not even made available to the appellees ....
By taking the above circumstances into account, the court restrictively construed Federal
Rule of Evidence 703. Moreover, one cannot necessarily exclude the possibility that a
manufacturing expert does customarily rely on statistics indicating the frequency of accidents involving the manufacturer's product.
56. See La. Code Evid. art. 703, supra note 9 (emphasis added).
57. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
58. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991).
59. Id.at 1112.
60. For a discussion on the split among the federal circuits as to which approach to
apply, see In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1243-45 (D.C.N.Y.
1985).
61. 589 So. 2d 1219 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991).
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was injured at sea while he was transferred from a sea vessel to an
offshore rig. The plaintiffs offered the testimony of a sea captain who
had nearly thirty years of experience in the field of transporting offshore
workers. 62 The court found that the sea captain was qualified, that he
relied upon data customarily relied upon by other experts, that he used
well-founded methodology, and that his opinion was relevant. The court
adopted the Christophersen63 court's liberal construction of Federal Rule
703 and stated, "By reference to the four inquiries established in the
Christophersen case, we find ... the record indicates that the facts
upon which Captain Torrence relied were the same type which would
have been relied on by other experts in the field . . . ."6 Consequently,
the court found the expert should have been allowed to testify to his
opinion under the liberal reading of Article 703.
In Malmay v. Sentry Insurance Co.,65 a wrongful death action, the
third circuit court of appeal allowed the plaintiff's expert to base his
opinion on accounting records prepared by the deceased's accountant,
income tax returns, and interviews with the accountant." Although some
of these otherwise hearsay documents and statements were not in the
record, the court determined the opinion was permissible because economic experts ordinarily rely on accounting records to form opinions
concerning economic loss. Although accounting records fit the type
requirement of Article 703, it is not at all clear that this expert's reliance
on these records was reasonable. The court might have found, after a
deeper inquiry, that this accountant was sympathetic to the plaintiffs'
claims; thus, the accountant had an incentive to lie to the expert.
Consequently, the court's use of the liberal approach allowed the expert's
opinion into evidence.
However, there is language in Willie v. American Casualty Co.,67
a first circuit case, indicating a restrictive interpretation of Article 703.
In Willie, the plaintiff was abducted and shot in the parking lot of a
shopping center. She offered the testimony of a security expert to show
the shopping center failed to provide adequate security measures. The
expert used police incident reports, attesting to the high crime in the
area, to form his opinion. The court held it was permissible for the
expert to testify to his opinion based on the reports. After the court
asserted that much deference should be given to experts' opinions as to
what is customarily relied on in the field, it stated:

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 1223.
Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991).
Adams, 589 So. 2d at 1224.
550 So. 2d 366 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989).
Id. at 370.
547 So. 2d 1075 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989), writ denied, 584 So. 2d 678 (1991).

1618

LOUISIANA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

We believe that it was reasonable to rely on the inadmissible
reports to form an expert opinion as to the level of criminal
activity at (the shopping center]. While every statement on every
police report may not have been true, the reported numbers and
types of crimes at a location is probably the best ... indicator
68
of the kinds and frequency of criminal acts actually occurring.
Here, the court analyzed the contents of the reports and determined
they were trustworthy, at least to the extent the expert could rely on
them. This is a restrictive reading of Article 703 regardless of whether
the court allowed the expert to testify to his opinion. And, most importantly, the bases were deemed trustworthy by the court, not by the
expert.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has not yet spoken on the issue.
However, in light of the different approaches taken by the circuits,
Louisiana should adopt a uniform method to interpret Article 703 to
make the outcome of litigation more predictable. As noted previously,
the restrictive approach is better and should be Louisiana's method of
interpreting Article 703 .69 Both interpretations, however, necessitate different treatments of the basis testimony once the opinion is admitted.
This issue will be discussed next.
VI.

SHOULD ARTICLE

703

ACT AS ANOTHER, EXCEPTION TO THE

HEARSAY RULE?

The Louisiana Code of Evidence has thirty-four exceptions to the
hearsay rule. 70 Four, found in Article 801, are treated as non-hearsay.
The others are expressly stated in Articles 803 and 804. Under Article
705, 71 the expert may state the facts and data upon which the opinion
is based on direct examination if ordered by the court even if the bases
are not in the record or are otherwise inadmissible for hearsay reasons.
This is in order that the fact-finder may properly evaluate the credibility

68.

Id. at 1079.

69. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
70. The justification behind the hearsay rule is well founded in the Anglo-American
system of justice. Credibility is based upon a witness' perception, memory, and ability
to truthfully and accurately convey the testimony to the trier of fact. Personal presence
is the key factor in determining the existence of these criteria since the witness' demeanor
bears heavily on credibility. Because a hearsay declarant is absent, he may not be tested
for credibility; subsequently, hearsay declarations may not be accepted for their truth.
However, if hearsay evidence has a sufficient degree of trustworthiness, indicated by the
circumstances surrounding the utterance or compilation of the data, hearsay will be
admitted into evidence under one of the exceptions. Additionally, failure to object to
otherwise inadmissible hearsay will constitute a waiver unless the evidence appears unreliable
in the particular case. McCormick, supra note 15, §§ 244-245.
71. See supra note 13.
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of the opinion. To what extent these bases are admissible is a question
warranting discussion here.
The justification is sound for limited admissibility of basis testimony
under the liberal approach because the approach simply does not provide
7
the adequate assurances of reliability all hearsay exceptions encompass. 1
Necessarily, the judge should give the jury a limiting instruction to
accept the basis testimony as mere support for the opinion, and not
for the truth. Some commentators have drawn an analogy between the
Federal Rules of Evidence 61271 and 703 to support this view.7 4 Just as
a writing used to refresh a witness' failed memory is not admissible as
substantive evidence, basis testimony is also inadmissible without a limiting instruction.7 5 Out-of-court documents used by witnesses under Rules
612 and 703 will carry little value with regard to reliability because they
have not been properly authenticated 76. and they fall within the definition
of hearsay 77 which necessarily gives rise to a presumption of unrelia78
bility.
Conversely, under the restrictive approach, the court will inquire
into the circumstantial trustworthiness of the expert's bases. If the bases
are deemed unreliable by the court, the expert could not possibly reasonably rely on the data. However, if the court finds the data is
trustworthy, the expert's reliance is reasonable. Thus, the justification
for limited admissibility disappears. The inquiry into the reliability will
assure a sufficient degree of trustworthiness-the same degree of reliability all hearsay exceptions require. Therefore, if one agrees with the
restrictive interpretation of Article 703, it follows that Article 703 should
be a back-door exception to the hearsay rule. Consequently, the basis
testimony should be admitted as substantive evidence when the court
72. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
73. See Fed. R. Evid. 612. When a witness testifies to loss of memory on direct
examination, the examiner may allow the witness to read from the document to refresh
his memory. Having read the writing, the witness may testify to its contents. The writing
need not be admissible into evidence under Rule 612. However, the cross-examiner may
choose to introduce the document into evidence. The same is true under Rule 703. The
expert may identify the out-of-court document on direct examination and base his opinion
on it. And, Rule 705 allows the cross-examiner to delve into the contents of the document.
74. Ronald L. Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 Vand.
L. Rev. 577, 583 (1986).
75. Id. at 583-84.
76. The requirement of authentication is found in Louisiana Code of Evidence article
901(A) which states: "The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what its proponent claims."
77. The definition of hearsay is found in Louisiana Code of Evidence article 801(C).
It states: 'Hearsay' is a statement, other than the one made by the declarant while
testifying at the present trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted."
78. Carlson, supra note 74, at 583-84.
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determines the expert reasonably relies on the underlying facts and data.
The Louisiana Legislature has indicated it opposes limited admis-

79
sibility of hearsay evidence having a sufficient degree of trustworthiness.

The Louisiana Code of Evidence has an express hearsay exception for
those statements having the requisite level of reliability tested by the
circumstances surrounding the utterance. The exception is found in Ar-

ticle 804(B)(6). s0 Although it is narrower than its federal counterparts, 8

the express nature of the exception provides a clear message: limited

admissibility is discouraged when the circumstances surrounding the statement make the statement as reliable as any other statement admitted
under one of the hearsay exceptions. In light of this message, basis
testimony should be admitted as substantive evidence when the circum-

stances guarantee the trustworthiness. Under the restrictive interpretation
of Article 703, circumstantial trustworthiness of basis testimony is tested
by the court.
Support for full admissibility may be derived from the fact that
Article 703 already acts as an exception to the original writing rule8"

and the requirement of authentication. 83 When an expert relies on writings
subject to the original writing rule or the authentication requirement
and the writing is not properly in evidence, the effect of the expert's
reliance on the writing is that the two rules are evaded. The rules are
then satisfied by the expert's reasonable reliance upon the document

and subsequent testimony to its contents as basis testimony.

79. McCormick, Evidence § 15, at 38-41 (E. Cleary 3d ed., 1984) (McCormick makes
this assertion about the Federal Rules of Evidence 803(24) and 804(b)(5). I have applied
McCormick's point to the Louisiana Code of Evidence article 804(b)(6).).
80. See supra note 46.
81. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) and 804(b)(5).
82. Michael H. Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the FederalRules of Evidence:
Insuring Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. 11.L. Rev. 43, 66 (1986). The
original writing rule is found in Louisiana Code of Evidence article 1002. It states: "To
prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording,
or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided by this Code or other legislation."
The rule only applies when a writing is offered into evidence for its truth. See Official
Comment (b) to La. Code Evid. art. 1002. However, in the case of a summary witness,
or a conduit expert, Article 703 will not act as an exception to the original writing rule
when the witness, "has gone to only one hearsay source and seeks merely to summarize
United States v. Williams, 431 F.2d 1168, 1172 (5th
the content of that source ....
Cir. 1970) (quoting Government's petition for rehearing, pp. 3-4), rev'd on other grounds,
447 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954, 92 S. Ct. 1168 (1972). But,
"if the witness has gone to many sources-although some or all be hearsay in natureand rather than introducing mere summaries of each source he uses them all, along with
his own professional experience, to arrive at his opinion, that evidence is regarded as
evidence in its own right .... " Id. at 1172. In footnote 6 of the opinion, the court
accepts the government's petition as an accurate statement of the law.
83. Graham, supra note 82. See also La. Code Evid. art. 901(A), supra note 76.
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Moreover, Article 703 is not subject to the requirement of firsthand
knowledge.14 The purpose of Article 703 is to enable experts to rely on
otherwise inadmissible data provided the data is "of a type reasonably
relied upon by other experts." Given the purpose of Article 703, which
is to expand the types of data experts rely upon to render opinions,
the view that Article 703 could act as another hearsay exception is a
plausible one and consistent with the other articles in the code relating
to expert opinion testimony. And, if Article 703 acts as a hearsay
exception, the basis testimony should carry substantive weight just like
all other exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Additionally, as a practical matter, the jury may be incapable of
following the limiting instruction that would accompany the liberal approach."s The consequence is the jury giving substantive weight to basis
testimony despite the limiting instruction. Once the opinion is admitted
with a limiting instruction, it is quite difficult for the jury to accept
6
the opinion as true without automatically accepting the bases as true,
especially if the expert himself accepts the basis as true for purposes
of rendering the opinion.17 Moreover, even if jurors could distinguish
between accepting a statement for its truth and accepting a statement
as mere support for an opinion, "jurors likely would not be capable
of performing such mental gymnastics.''88
Courts giving a liberal reading to Article 703 do not inquire into
the circumstantial trustworthiness of the basis testimony. The inquiry is
not needed because of the expert's reasonable reliance on the data.
Without this inquiry, the jury should not be allowed to accept the bases
as true even though they may in fact be true. Otherwise, the hearsay
rule would be violated. But with a restrictive interpretation of Article
703, the circumstantial trustworthiness of the underlying facts and data
will be tested by the court. Therefore, the basis testimony should be
admitted as substantive evidence. And, with the majority of Louisiana
courts interpreting Article 703 liberally which requires a limiting instruction and the increasing use of expert testimony in the courts today, the
problem of jurors not understanding and following the limiting instruction is magnified.

84. The requirement of firsthand knowledge is found in Louisiana Code of Evidence
article 602. The pertinent part states: "A witness may not testify to a matter unless.
1evidence is introduced to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter.
This Article is not subject to the provisions of Article 703, relating to opinion testimony
by expert witnesses." (emphasis added).
85. Rice, supra note 51, at 585.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.

88.

Id.
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Furthermore, courts sometimes fail to make the distinction between
Article 703 and other hearsay exceptions." For example, in Bryan v.
John Bean Division," the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals restrictively interpreted Federal Rule of Evidence 703 to exclude the opinion
of the plaintiff's expert in a products liability dispute. While referring
to Rule 703 the court stated, "Like all exceptions to the hearsay rule
the full disclosure of the source underlying a testifying expert's opinion
depends upon the two critical factors of necessity and trustworthiness." 91
The same reference to Rule 703 as a hearsay exception occurred in
United States v. Williams. 92 There the court stated, "Expert witness
testimony is a widely-recognized exception to the rule against hearsay
testimony."" 9 Just because some courts label Rule 703 as a hearsay
exception does not mean it is one. However, the very fact that courts
refer to Rule 703 as an exception indicates Rule 703 is so close to an
exception that it may very well function as one.
However, a potential problem accompanies this position. In short,
a party's entire case could be presented through a biased expert under
the disguise of basis testimony." Moreover, Article 70491 makes this
argument more plausible because experts may testify to an ultimate issue
that should be decided by the jury. 96 The possibility of this happening
will be slim when facts are in the record to support the expert's opinion.
When the opinion is derived from data not in the record which tend
to prove a fact at issue, a suggested solution to lessen the significance
of the problem is to limit the expert's use of data not in the record
to data which is otherwise unavailable under the definition found in
Article 804(A). 97 The opposing party, however, should have notice and
opportunity to attack the expert's use of the unavailable data to comply
with the notice requirement of Article 804(B)(6). 91 The availability re-

89. Graham, supra note 82, at 66 n.112.
90.

566 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1978).

91.

Id. at 545.

92. 447 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954, 92 S. Ct. 1168 (1972).
93. Id. at 1290.

94. Rice, supra note 51, at 592.
95. Louisiana Code of Evidence article 704 states: "Testimony in the form of an
opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not to be excluded solely because it embraces
an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact ...
96. Rice, supra note 51, at 592 n.33.
97. Id. at 592. See Louisiana Code of Evidence article 804(A) for a definition ofl
unavailability.
98. Under Louisiana Code of Evidence article 804(B)(6), a statement is admissible
"if the court determines that considering all pertinent circumstances in the particular case
the statement is trustworthy, and the proponent of the evidence has adduced or made a
reasonable effort to adduce all other admissible evidence to establish the fact to which
the proffered statement relates and the proponent of the statement makes known in writing
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quirement would serve as a deterrent for abuse of expert basis testimony
by attorneys who are inadequately prepared or who lack sufficient
evidence and who try to present their cases through a biased expert.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The articles in the Louisiana Code of Evidence relating to expert
opinion testimony are designed to regulate the reliability of this form
of evidence. The reasonable reliance test of Article 703 is specifically
concerned with the reliability of the expert's underlying facts and data
which form the basis of the opinion by providing a safeguard against
the jury considering opinions based on unreliable hearsay. But, the
reasonable reliance test is subject to differing interpretations.
The liberal approach gives the expert the discretion to determine
whether the data the expert relied upon is the kind other experts in the
field use to form similar opinions. The court does not inquire into the
circumstantial trustworthiness of the data because it is assumed experts
are more qualified to evaluate the reliability of the data than either the
judge or the jury. Under the restrictive approach, not only must the
data meet the "type" requirement, but also the judge must make an
additional inquiry into the circumstantial trustworthiness of the data.
The restrictive interpretation is preferable because it will adequately
assure that the facts and data forming the basis of expert opinions are
reliable enough for the jury to consider, rather than taking the expert's
word for it.
The Louisiana circuits are not in agreement as to which approach
to use. Necessarily, the Louisiana Supreme Court should rule on this
issue to provide a uniform system to interpret Article 703 to make the
outcome of litigation more predictable. However, if Louisiana adopts
the restrictive method, Article 703 should act as another exception to
the hearsay rule.
Courts should allow the basis testimony to be heard by the jury
for its truth under the restrictive approach because first, the restrictive
approach will adequately assure the reliability of basis testimony. If so,
limited admissibility of data having a sufficient degree of circumstantial
trustworthiness is discouraged by the code. Second, Article 703 acts as
an exception to other evidentiary rules such as the original writing rule,
the requirement of authentication, and the requirement of first-hand
knowledge. Third, jurors will have difficulty following limiting instructions. It follows, then, that expert bases should not have limited admissibility if the restriction is too difficult to implement. Fourth, when

to the adverse party and to the court his intention to offer the statement and the particulars
of it .. .sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with
a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it."
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courts fail to distinguish between Article 703 and other hearsay exceptions, Article 703 functions as a hearsay exception; thus, Article 703
should be treated like one. By limiting the expert's use of data not
already in the record to data meeting the definition of unavailability
under Article 803(A), the possibility of any abuse of expanded admissibility will be reduced.
On a final note, expert opinions are an invaluable form of testimony.
That is why this comment encourages full admissibility of basis testimony. Expert testimony is distinguished from all other forms of evidence
because experts hold a monopoly over their knowledge, skill, and experience. But, like all other forms of evidence, expert opinions and their
bases need to be sufficiently reliable to insure the integrity of the judicial
system. This objective can be accomplished by the restrictive interpretation of Louisiana Code of Evidence article 703.
Laura Owen Wingate

